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TORTS-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-THE GOVERNMENT'S
LIABILITY FOR TORTIOUS CONDUCT ARISING
FROM PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS
Wayne C. Carroll was injured in a drilling operation accident on No-
vember 19, 1964. He was rushed to the University of Kansas Medical
Center where a team of doctors replanted his partially severed left arm.
In the early morning hours of November 27, 1964, while in a drugged
and confused state, the patient, who had been progressing satisfactorily
after his operation, ripped off the bandages and splints from his arm
The night resident surgeon rewrapped the arm and replaced the splints.
Approximately forty-eight hours later, on November 29, 1964, the patient
was discovered sitting on the edge of his bed, apparently having again
ripped off all the bandages and reopened the wound. The damage was so
extensive that the arm had to be amputated.
Carroll was a private patient occupying a single room and paying the
full rate. The University of Kansas Medical Center, under the control of
the Board of Regents of the State of Kansas, was a general hospital offering
a highly and specially trained service to the public. The patient's physi-
cian was a staff doctor of the hospital, and while he did treat private
patients at the hospital, he was, at all times in his treatment of Carroll,
acting as the agent, servant and employee of the University Medical Cen-
ter.
Carroll filed an action against both the doctor treating him and the
Board of Regents of the State of Kansas seeking damages of $150,000,
for the defendant's negligence. The District Court of Wyandotte County
sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss the action. The Supreme
Court of Kansas reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's action, and in so
doing, held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity for torts was abolished
with respect to the proprietary functions conducted by the state or its gov-
ernmental agencies. Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21 (1969).
This note will discuss the varying theories of immunity from liability
prevelant in American jurisprudence with regard to torts committed by a
governmental unit. In order to accomplish this, it will be necessary to
draw distinctions between the functions of the governmental units, trace the
origin of the theories, and attempt to place these theories in the perspective
of today's status of the law.
1971] CASE NOTES 303
The doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability stems from
the English common law notion that the "King can do no wrong."' The
King's Bench in 1788 in Russell v. Men of Devon 2 held that an unincor-
porated town was not liable for its torts. Because the action was in effect
brought against the citizens of the town in their individual capacity, the
court held that recovery could not be had since there was no common fund
from which damages could be awarded-the plaintiff was, in a sense, suing
himself, and could not recover. The Russell case serving as a guideline, this
principle was introduced into American jurisprudence in 18123 by the Mas-
sachusetts courts. The distinguishing characteristic in this case is that it
was an unincorporated governmental unit that was held immune from tort
liability.
The concept of immunity from tort did not originate from the idea of
sovereign immunity, but it arose in connection with cases dealing with the
liability of local government. While this rule-immunity from tort for gov-
ernmental units-has continued to be followed by the majority of courts
in the United States, England has meanwhile repudiated the theory. The
concept of liability for torts while engaged in a proprietary function, has
1. The court in the Carroll case was not of the opinion that this theory could
be traced to this medieval concept. They, in effect, make the observation that the
American Revolution was fought to eradicate all rights of the sovereign.
2. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). This was an action upon the case against
the men dwelling in the county of Devon, to recover satisfaction for an injury done
to the wagon of the plaintiffs in consequence of a bridge being out of repair,
which ought to have been repaired by the county. The court held that the action
would note lie because: (a) To permit it would lead to an "infinity of actions;"
(b) there was no precedent for attempting such a suit; (c) only the legislature
should impose liability of this kind; (d) even if defendants are to be considered a
corporation or quasi-corporation, there is no fund out of which to satisfy the claim;
(e) neither law nor reason supports the action; (f) there is a strong presumption
that what has never been done cannot be done; and (g) although there is a legal
principle which permits a remedy for every injury resulting from the neglect of an-
other, a more applicable principle is "that it is better that an individual should sus-
tain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience." Spanel v.
Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 281 (1962).
3. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 6 Am. Dec. 63 (1812).
The court denied recovery to plaintiff for damage to his horse, caused by a fall on a
defective city bridge. The court stated: "(q)uasi corporations, created by the
legislature for purposes of public policy are subject by the common law, to an in-
dictment for the neglect of duties enjoined on them; but are not liable to an action
for such neglect, unless the action be given by some statute." Id. at 249, 6 Am.
Dec. at 63. The court in Hargrave v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130
(Fla. 1957) takes notice of the fact that Russell v. Men of Devon was decided
twelve years after our Declaration of Independence, a document which severed all
our ties with the "King." Mr. Justice Traynor came to the same conclusion as he
observed: "Nothing seems more clear than that this immunity of the King from the
jurisdiction of the King's court was purely personal. How it came to be applied in
the United States of America, where the prerogative is unknown, is one of the
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been adhered to since 1890 in the United States.4 Through the process
of legal evolution, the American courts have found themselves in the para-
doxical situation of adhering to the tenents of a doctrine which has been
refuted by the source from which it was derived."
In attempting to free themselves from the harshness of the govern-
mental immunity doctrine, American courts have drawn a distinction be-
tween "governmental" and "proprietary" functions of the government. In
essence, this distinction can be reduced to the difference between im-
munity and liability, as stated in Stadler v. Curtis Gas, Inc.:
[t]he rationale behind the "governmental-proprietary" dichotomy is that when a
public entity is involved in a governmental function, it is immune from tort liability,
but when involved in a proprietary function, it loses the cloak of immunity ...
The terms "public, sovereign, political, state, mandatory, essential, discretionary, leg-
islative" have been used interchangeably with governmental .... private, non-gov-
ernmental, nonessential" are interchangeable with proprietary. 6
The court recognizes, in the above quote, the dual function of a govern-
ment, its primary function being inherent and deriving its authority from
the people, and its secondary or extra-governmental activities being un-
dertaken on its own behalf, e.g., T.V.A. 7
The immunity of officials engaged in a governmental function is pre-
mised on the dictates of public policy that officials of all branches of gov-
ernment should remain immune from liability in the performance of their
duties imposed by law.8 A parallel can, at this point, be drawn with the
Federal Tort Claims Act,9 which denies liability for torts committed by
mysteries of legal evolution." Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L.J. 1, 4 (1924).
4. Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 215, 359 P.2d 457,
459 (1961).
5. Crisp v. Thomas, 63 L.T.N.S. 756 (1890). The court held that an English
school district is subject to suit in tort for personal injuries on the same basis as a pri-
vate individual or corporation. Tort claims against the Crown were expressly au-
thorized by the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44.
6. Justice McCown concurring in Stadler v. Curtis Gas Inc., 182 Neb. 6, 21,
151 N.W.2d 915, 923 (1967).
7. See Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction between Public and Private
Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corpora-
tions, 16 ORE. L. REv. 250 (1937).
8. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2nd Cir. 1926). This court placed immunity
of government officials in all branches of government on grounds of public policy.
Other cases which have expanded this holding include Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F.2d 769
(1937); Lang v. Wood, 67 App. D.C. 287, 92 F.2d 211 (1937); and Mellon v.
Brewer, 57 App. D.C. 126, 18 F.2d 168 (1927). The basis for so holding is that the
basic policy decisions of government are non-tortious.
9. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (1964), withholding liability of the United States for
damage arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit and performance or failure to per-
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any agent engaged in a discretionary capacity of his governmental duties.
This proposition as applied to all levels of government can seek additional
support in agency law.10 Public officers have no authority to bind the
sovereign-in the case of American democracy, the whole people-except
as is given by the specific constitutional or statutory provisons creating
their offices." To hold officials liable for performing their delegated
duties, those of carrying on the ends of government, would be inconsistent
with the public interest. The government is free to engage in many activi-
ties that might result in harm to others as long as such activities are not
tortious. "It is not a tort for government to govern.' 2 Under the Ameri-
can system of government, the legal sovereignty rests in the people, and
the people in the exercise of their governmental power, working through the
states, do not wish to be sued and harassed in carrying out their govern-
mental functions.'1 Where the exercise of these functions encroach upon
or are in competition with the private sector, then the "wish" for immunity
should yield to those laws that dictate the responsibilities and liabilities that
regulate that private sector. It is at this point of time that the government
is said to be engaged in a "proprietary" function.
The government engages in a proprietary enterprise when it "em-
barks on an enterprise which is commercial in character or which is usually
carried on by private individuals or private companies.' 4 The test relied
upon the court in the Carroll case was:
[w]hen there is an activity or function in a private or proprietary capacity for the
special or immediate profit, benefit, or advantage of the city or town, or people who
compose it, rather than for the public at large, then the city or town is in competition
with private enterprise. . . .15
The competitive aspect of the particular activity seems to best crys-
tallize the distinction: private enterprise cannot compete with a true
governmental activity; it is in the reverse situation, government competing
with private enterprise, where the proprietary function appears.
If the state is engaged in a proprietary function, as determined by
form a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretionary power was
abused or not.
10. Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, does not apply in relations between state
officers and their subordinates, unless the superior participates or the directs act.
People v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 42 Cal. App. 2d 409, 108 P.2d 923
(1941).
11. Brown v. City of Craig, 350 Mo. 836, 841, 168 S.W.2d 1080, 1082 (1943).
12. Brief of Appellant at 15.
13. Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 847, 457 P.2d 21, 27 (1969).
14. Id. at 849, 457 P.2d at 28, quoting from Stadler, supra note 6.
15. Id. at 850, 457 P.2d at 28, quoting from Stolp v. Arkansas City, 180 Kan.
197, 202, 303 P.2d 123, 127 (1956).
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application of the court approved test, it is inconsistent to restrict the
state's liability via the doctrine of immunity, when other private partici-
pants, engaged in the same operations of business as is the state, are held
strictly to the tort principles which govern the field. Nevertheless, the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity has historically shielded not only the govern-
mental functions of the state, but also the proprietary functions. In order
to fully appreciate the adherence to the total immunity concept, it is
necessary to examine the arguments and rationale in support of this doc-
trine.
The earliest and most often employed argument for the continuation
of total immunity doctrine is that there is no fund designated16 or avail-
able out of which claims against the state can be paid. The state con-
sistently contends that any and all funds to which it has access have been
earmarked and collected through taxation for a specific and defined
purpose. 17 Justice Davis, dissenting in Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit Dist., stated this position as follows:
The reason, as often expressed, is one of public policy, to protect public funds and
public property. "Taxes are raised for certain specific governmental purposes; and if
they could be diverted to the payment of damage claims, the more important work of
government, which every municipality must perform regardless of its other rela-
tions, would be seriously impaired if not totally destroyed."' 8
Impairment of public funds is concededly an important consideration in
the operation of the governmental body, but liability insurance can today
remove the threat of depletion of the public coffers.19 It is this same type
of insurance that all members of the private sector employ as protection and
to use the words of Justice Davis, while some business men have been "im-
paired," few, if any, have been "totally destroyed" by resorting to these
less than drastic means. This liability insurance could provide protec-
tion to the state and its agencies at a moderate cost which could be budgeted
in advance. 20 Private concerns engaged in enterprises with greater risk
exposure than that to which the state would be subject, have had to bear
the cost of insurance without any noticeable loss to their operational suc-
16. This theory was the basis for denying recovery in Russell v. County of Devon,
supra note 2, which most American courts have adhered to as precedent.
17. Brown v. City of Craig, supra note 9.
18. 18 Ill. 2d 11, 32, 163 N.E.2d 89, 100 (1959) quoting 18 MCQUILLIN,
§ 53.24.
19. For a discussion of plans available to governmental agencies see Gibbons,
Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State and Local Government, DUKE
L.J. 588 (1959).
20. Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, supra note 4 at 216, 359 P.2d at 460;
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., supra note 18 at 18, 163 N.E.2d at 96;
Hargrove v. City of Cocoa Beach, supra note 3 at 133; Spanel v. Mounds View
School Dist., supra note 2 at 290, 118 N.W.2d at 804.
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cess and there is no reason to surmise that the state could not do likewise. 2'
The underlying rationale is founded on the exclusive nature of the funds en-
trusted to government in the promotion of its operations; liability payments
for negligence would evidently deter this end. The adherence to this doc-
trine of "protection of the public funds" is in derogation of the fundamental
concept in the common law of torts; namely, that liability follows negli-
gence. 22 Liability is the general rule; immunity is the exception that can
lead to unconscionable results. 23 This situation concerned the Minnesota
court in Spanel v. Mounds View School District No. 621 which abrogated
the immunity doctrine on grounds of its inequality and outdatedness. In
the parlance of the court:
[t]he whole doctrine of governmental immunity from liability for tort rests upon a
rotten foundation. It is almost incredible that in this modem age of comparative
sociological enlightenment, and in a republic, the medieval absolutism supposed to
be implicit in the maxim "the King can do no wrong", should exempt the various
branches of the government from liability for their torts, and that the entire burden
of damage resulting from the wrongful acts of the government should be imposed
upon the single individual who suffers the injury, rather than distributed among the
entire community constituting the government ... where it justly belongs.2 4
By continuing to allow the government to remain immune from tort lia-
bility, the courts have, in effect, persecuted the injured citizen, which the
government is charged with protecting--certainly a contradiction in ap-
plication.
The courts which have abolished the doctrine of governmental im-
munity with respect to proprietary functions have been cognizant of the
"protection of the public funds" theory by granting only prospective abro-
gation of the immunity doctrine.25 While allowing recovery in the case
before the court and postponing application to future cases, the courts
have allowed the legislature ample time to make provisions so as to al-
leviate the "hardship to those who have relied upon prior decisions of the
court."'26 A ruling of this nature is essentially a mandate to the legisla-
ture to either establish immunity by statute, 27 or acquire insurance so as to
21. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 259, 111 N.W.2d 1, 24 (1961).
22. Supra note 12, at 24.
23. Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, supra note 4 at 217, 359 P.2d at 462;
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., supra note 18 at 14, 163 N.E.2d at 93;
Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 762, 267 P.2d 934, 942 (1954).
24. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., supra note 20 at 288, 118 N.W.2d at
801, quoting from Barber v. City of Sante Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 88, 136 P.2d 480, 482
(1943) (emphasis added).
25. Carroll v. Kittle, supra note 13 at 850, 457 P.2d at 29; Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist., supra note 18; Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26,
115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
26. Carroll v. Kittle, supra note 13 at 850, 457 P.2d at 29.
27. Illinois, after the Molitor case, passed a number of such statutes limiting
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afford protection for their negligent acts. The occurrence of this type of
decision, the prospective application, leads us into the question of the
proper body to abrogate the immunity doctrine-the judiciary or the state
legislature?
Most courts, when confronted with the problem of holding a govern-
mental unit liable for its tortious conduct, have avoided the issue by claim-
ing lack of jurisdiction because the state legislature is the proper body to
abrogate or amend the existing substantive law.2 8 The most emphatic state-
ment of this judicial dodge was enunciated by the Florida Court of Appeals
when it ruled that:
[a] proper administration of justice invites respect for the admonition of Alexander
Hamilton, who once wrote that courts "must declare the sense of the law and if they
should be disposed to exercise will instead of judgment, the consequences would
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body." If,
therefore, a change in the long established rule of immunity prevailing in this State
is to be made, it must come. . . by the constitutional amendment, or by enactment of
appropriate legislation, or both.29
Contrary to the view that legislative action is necessary in the abolition of
governmental immunity, other courts have reasoned "that they should be
alive to the demands of justice and . . .see no necessity for insisting on
legislative action in a matter which the courts themselves originated.' 30
liability to certain amounts and in other cases allowed immunity to prevail. For a
general discussion of the approach in Illinois see Baum, Tort Liability of Local
Governments and Their Employees: An Introduction to the Illinois Immunity Act,
54 NW. U. L. REv. 588 (1959); also, Comment, Governmental Immunity in Illinois:
The Molitor Decision and Its Legislative Reaction, 9 DePaul L. Rev. 39 (1959).
28. McCoy v. Board of Regents, 196 Kan. 506, 413 P.2d 73 (1966), reversed
by the Carroll case; Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, 256 Iowa 337,
127 N.W.2d 606 (1964); Urow v. District of Columbia, 316 F.2d 351 (Cir. 1963);
Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo Valley Hospital, 72 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d 168 (1963); McKen-
zie v. City of Florence, 234 S.C. 428, 108 S.E.2d 825 (1959); Buck v. McLean, 115
So. 2d 764 (Fla. App. 1959). The rationale of those courts which have refused to
take the initiative is best expressed by Chief Justice Price, dissenting in Carroll, he
states: "This decision is another example of the wave of 'judicial activism' that has
been sweeping this country in recent years ...... The doctrine-for good or for bad
-has been recognized and applied since statehood. As such, it has become so deeply
imbedded as to be the 'public policy' of this state. If the public policy of this state is
to be changed I think that it should be accomplished by the people of this state acting
through their duly elected legislature-and not by this court. The power of this court
is enormous, but about the only check upon the exercise of that power is our own
sense of self-restraint."
29. Buck v. McLean, supra note 28, at 768.
30. Hargrove v. City of Cocoa Beach, supra note 3, at 132. Justice Pomeroy,
dissenting in Laughner v. Allegheny County, 261 A.2d 607 (1970), adheres to the
philosophy that the courts can change the existing law, if the need arises. He states:
"Growth and flexibility no less than stability and predictability are essential to any
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The question of whether the action is proper subject matter for the legisla-
ture has posed a problem to those courts which have taken it upon them-
selves to abolish the doctrine.31 A reading of the opinions will reveal such
hesitancies as:
[w]e would suggest that the legislature is in a much better position than this court to
restrict the application of the doctrine .... 32
[w]e readily concede that the flexibility of the legislative process-which is denied
the judiciary-makes the latter (legislative) avenue of approach more desirable. 33
While attempting to evade a judicial reversal of the doctrine of soverign
immunity, but evidencing interest in the implications of such adherence to
the concept, some courts have found refuge in the dictates of stare decisis.
By adherence to previous rulings handed down by the same tribunals and
paying service to their inception in the public policy of the state,34 the
courts have respected the dictates of stare decisis. To regard stare deci-
sis as a "principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to
the latest decision, however recent and questionable," 35 should be the func-
tion of the court. Circumstances change with the times and the decisions
of the court must meet those new conditions. "The law is not static, but
consists of fundamental principles and reasons and the substance of rules as
illustrated by the reasons on which they are based."'36  It is the duty of
the courts to correspond the changing concepts of justice and rights to
the rules which they dictate; adherence to precedent, when the conditions
as they presently exist no longer relate, is employing stare decisis as a rule
rather than a policy.3 7 With the emergence of the state as an active parti-
living legal system, and the courts are equally charged with preserving both elements
and with accommodating their occasionally competing demands."
31. Carroll v. Kittle, supra note 13; Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist.,
supra note 18; Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., supra note 20; Muskopf v.
Coming Hospital Dist., supra note 4; Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93
Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Colorado Racing Commission v. Brush Racing
Association, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957); Kamau v. Hawaii County, 41
Ha. 527 (1957).
32. Carroll v. Kittle, supra note 13 at 848, 457 P.2d at 27.
33. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., supra note 20, at 803.
34. Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 157 Me. 174, 170 A.2d 687 (1961).
35. Kamau v. Hawaii County, supra note 31, at 550.
36. Kamau v. Hawaii County, supra note 31, at 552.
37. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., supra note 18. See Littlefield,
Stare Decisis, Prospective Overruling, and Judicial Legislation in the Context of
Sovereign Immunity, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 56. The court in Carroll heeded this duty
when it failed to follow the dictates of stare decisis. In refusing to apply prece-
dent, the court stated: "It is suggested that we are violating the rule of stare decisis.
We are insofar as we are eliminating discrimination between certain governmental
agencies. Although we have great respect for the rule and recognize its desirability
from the stand-point of certainty and stability, it does not follow that we are re-
quired to perpetuate a doctrine that is no longer applicable because of changes in
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cipant in the competitive market of the private sector, an occurrence that
the early courts, in laying down the general principles of immunity from
tort liability of the sovereign in the exercise of its functions, did not ex-
perience, the law as it relates to a government's tort liability must change.
In response to the judiciary's refusal to act, either because of intrusion into
the legislature's sphere or due to stare decisis, the Florida court offers
a constitutional argument, stating:
If there is anything more than a sham to our constitutional guarantee that the courts
shall always be open to redress wrongs and to our sense of justice that there shall be
a remedy for every wrong committed .... 38
Does reliance on decisions involving factual situations not applicable to the
present concept of justice, in effect, close the courts for the redress of griev-
ances?39 Is dismissal of an injured party's cause of action, when the in-
jury was caused by the state operating in a proprietary function, an in-
vidious discrimination" violative of the Equal Protection Clause 40 of the
United States Constitution? Is denial of recovery an infringement of the
Due Process Clause?41  In short, is strict adherence to outmoded legal
concepts implicitly protected by stare decisis, in conflict with explicit, fun-
damental guarantees of the Constitution? The courts, if the trend in the
majority of states prevails, will find themselves faced with these constitu-
tional issues-issues which they will have to answer.
The states that have abrogated the doctrine have done so without re-
lying upon the constitutional arguments. Most states have disposed of the
doctrine on the grounds that it "is mistaken and unjust, ' 42 "anachoristic
[sic] not only to our system of justice but to our traditional concepts of
economic and social conditions. The rule should not be followed to such an extent
that errors be perpetuated or grievous wrongs result. We are of the opinion that
when reason for a rule no longer exists, the rule itself should be abandoned."
Carroll v. Kittle, supra note 13 at 847, 457 P.2d at 27-28.
38. Hargrove v. City of Cocoa Beach, supra note 20, at 132.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peacably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." (Emphasis added)
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." (Emphasis added)
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
42. Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., supra note 4, at 213; Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist., supra note 18, at 25.
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democratic government" 43 or no "longer applicable because of changes
in economic and social conditions."' 44  In a separate opinion in Williams
v. City of Detroit, Justice Black comes right to the point as he observes:
Little time need be spent in determining whether the strict doctrine of immunity from
tort liability should be repudiated. All this is old straw. The question is not "Should
we?"; it is "How may the body be interred judicially with nondiscriminatory last
rites?" 45
It is this view, that the doctrine in respect to proprietary activities is no
longer justified, that seems to be gaining momentum and support. Eight
states since 1957 have abrogated the doctrine by judicial decree.46  Kansas
in the Carroll case reversed the position they had affirmed as recently as
1966. 47
What the courts which have discarded the doctrine are recognizing is
the dual character of the governmental unit. On the one hand the tradition
function of government in policy and decision-making 48 is carried on and
duly protected by immunity and on the other is the participation of govern-
ment agencies in competition in the public marketplace. It is the latter
role that these courts have exposed to the hazards of the marketplace, that
is liability for wrongdoing. It is this duality in its most pronounced form
that can no longer be cloaked in the expensive garment of sovereign im-
munity. There is a constitutional line between the "state as government
and the state as a trader." 49  When that line is transgressed, the cloak
should be dropped and the state should be held to the same liabilities
43. Hargrove v. City of Cocoa Beach, supra note 20, at 132.
44. Carroll v. Kittle, supra note 13, Syllabus of the Court 5.
45. Williams v. City of Detroit, supra note 21, at 241.
46. Arizona (1962) Hernandez v. County of Yuma, 91 Ariz. 35, 369 P.2d 271;
Florida (1957) Hargrove v. City of Cocoa Beach, supra note 20; Illinois (1959)
Molitor v. Kaneland Community School Dist., supra note 18; Indiana (1969)
Perkins v. State, 251 N.E.2d 30; Kansas (1961) Carroll v. Kittle; Michigan (1961)
Williams v. City of Detroit, supra note 21; and Minnesota (1962) Spanel v. Mounds
View School District, supra note 20. For a general discussion of status of the gov-
ernmental unit with respect to liability for tortious conduct, see Van Alstyne, Gov-
ernmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919 (1966).
47. McCoy v. Board of Regents, supra note 28.
48. Justice Pomeroy, in Laughner v. Allegheny County, supra note 30 recongizes
this duality and the need for immunity in the "governmental function," he observes:
"It should be noted that the abandonment of the rule of immunity as it is presently
applied would not put an end to all immunities. 'No one today urges that a judicial
remedy be given for all the injuries that may result from mistaken governmental
action, or that the courts should decide when governmental action of a political na-
ture is mistaken. The proper sphere of governmental immunity will remain a vital
question even under systems which relax the indefensibly broad immunity which
still prevails.'" Laughner v. Allegheny County, supra note 30, at 619, quoting from
Hargrove v. City of Cocoa Beach, supra note 20, at 133.
49. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 578 (1946).
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as are those with whom they are competing. As the activities of the
state and its agencies are constantly expanding, so should the law which
governs and the courts which interpret; the court should be heedful of
the words of Justice Cardozo, as he stated:
Existing rules and principles can give us our present location, our bearings, our lati-
tude and longitude. The inn that shelters for the night is not the journey's end.
The law, like the traveler, must be ready for the morrow. It must have a principle of
growth.50
The Kansas Supreme Court in the Carroll decision has heeded the
words of Justice Cardozo. By holding the state and its agents liable for
torts committed while engaged in a proprietary function, the court applied
the law as it should be, rather than as it was. The court has taken
previous decisions as a means rather than an end and has, through a
proper application of the doctrine of stare decisis, allowed the law to grow.
Hopefully, other states will take their bearings from the Carroll court and
allow law to continue on its journey to justice.
James Kemp
50. CARDozo, THE GROwTH oF THE LAw 19-20 (1924).
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